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The Relationship between Perceptions of Inequality and Political 
Participation: The Case of the Western Balkans  
Bruno Martorano  
 
Summary 
This paper discusses how disparities and in particular perceptions of inequality may have 
influenced political participation in Western Balkans over the last years. The arrival of the 
international crisis in the last quarter of 2008 has had not only economic but also significant 
political consequences on the region. While citizens’ participation through conventional 
channels has continued decreasing, there has been a rising opposition to political and 
economic institutions channelled by the emergence of new social movements. This paper 
shows that these political changes were largely motivated not by observed changes in 
income distribution but by people’s perceptions of rising disparities between rich and poor. 
This analysis is further supported by the empirical testing of a number of mechanisms that 
may shape the relationship between inequality and political participation such as 
expectations, changes in living conditions and corruption. 
 
Keywords: inequality; perceptions of inequality; expectations; corruption; political 
participation; Western Balkans. 
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Practice summary 
This paper discusses how disparities and, in particular, perceptions of inequality may have 
influenced political participation in the Western Balkans over recent years. After the decade 
of armed conflicts, these small countries started their economic and political transition in the 
early 2000s. Yet the arrival of the international financial crisis in 2008 had not only economic 
but also significant political consequences for the region. While citizen participation through 
conventional channels has continued to decrease, there has been a rising opposition to 
political and economic institutions channelled by the emergence of new social movements. 
This paper argues that these political changes were largely motivated not by observed 
changes in income distribution but by people’s perceptions of rising disparities between rich 
and poor people.  
 
Why do perceptions matter more than the objective value of inequality? 
This paper reconsiders two strong assumptions which are implicit in the recent literature 
linking inequality and political changes. The first is that people have equal access to 
information; yet this is not true because access to information is not the same for all 
individuals. The second assumption is that people have the same ability to assess the value 
of inequality in society. Yet this is also far from reality, since people do not have the same 
skills. Rejecting both assumptions, this paper argues that perceptions of disparities matter 
more than the objective value of inequality in explaining certain motivations and behaviours 
and, in particular, political participation. Indeed, it seems that the recent crisis has had a 
dramatic impact, especially on subjective assessments of living conditions. What is 
interesting to observe is that people feel that disparities have increased even though the 
level of inequality has decreased or remained stable. On average, around 62 per cent of 
respondents to the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) III in Western Balkan countries believe 
that the gap between rich and poor has become larger, while only 5 per cent believe the gap 
has narrowed. 
 
How might changes in perceptions of inequality affect political participation? 
This paper shows empirically that perceptions of inequality play a key role in people’s 
participation in political activities. In particular, perceptions of rising disparities decrease 
people’s participation in voting in parliamentary elections but increase people’s participation 
in protests. The results also point out that perceptions of inequality have a stronger effect on 
alternative forms of political participation such as voting in local elections, participating in 
strikes and signing a petition. In addition, this paper confirms that political participation is 
influenced by other factors such as current economic, social and demographic factors and 
that the determinants of mobilisation through conventional and unconventional channels are 
very similar. 
 
This analysis is further supported by the empirical testing of a number of mechanisms that 
may shape the relationship between inequality and political participation. Income shocks at 
national level (such as the 2008 financial crisis) increase feelings of failure and 
disappointment, which in turn make people more averse to inequality. In particular, the 
worsening of national economic conditions or unexpected economic shocks are perceived as 
a result of circumstances that go beyond individual responsibility, reducing tolerance to 
inequality and therefore influencing how people engage with political activities. At the same 
time, high expectations about future economic conditions increase people’s tolerance of 
inequality. However, trust in political institutions plays a key role in shaping political 
participation. Indeed, perceptions of high levels of corruption tend to increase people’s 
preference to participate through unconventional channels, reflecting a belief that traditional 
political actors are not able to represent all strata in society, particularly the most vulnerable 
groups.  
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Key policy lessons  
These results highlight the need to reduce inequality in order to improve the quality of 
democracy. However, as shown by the analysis, policymakers should also pay attention to 
people’s perceptions, subjective assessments and expectations about the future. Moreover, 
citizens may be more inclined to respect political rules if political institutions are seen as 
representative, fair and transparent. Therefore, it is important to take all these factors into 
serious consideration in order to increase the successful implementation of a set of reforms 
(especially in crisis times) and promote the process of democratic consolidation. Other 
democratic institutions may have important roles in such contexts. For example, the 
existence of parties or movements capable of giving voice to the experiences and views of 
the most marginalised groups may be crucial in preventing resentment, discharging 
grievances, and thereby mitigating social and political instability.  
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1 Introduction 
Political participation is a key ingredient of the democratic process (Almond and Verba 1963; 
Linz and Stepan 1996; Gaventa and Martorano 2016). As explained by Barber (1984: 267), 
‘if all of the people can participate some of the time in some of the responsibilities of 
governing, then strong democracy will have realized its aspirations’. In contrast, ‘where few 
take part in decisions there is little democracy’ (Verba and Nie 1972: 1). Following these 
lines, a large body of the literature focuses on the consequences of growing disparities on 
citizens’ engagement with political activities. Yet, the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature provide mixed conclusions. According to a widespread argument in the political 
science, rising or high levels of inequality might be hypothesised to provide people in the 
bottom of the distribution with additional motivations to engage in politics (Filetti 2016). 
Nonetheless, the recent empirical evidence tends to show that inequality decreases citizens’ 
engagement in political activities (Anderson and Beramendi 2008; Karakoc 2013; Filetti 
2016; Solt 2008).  
 
Analysing the recent waves of protests across the world, some scholars have also provided 
contrasting results. Ortiz et al. (2013), for example, report that the vast majority of 
demonstrations during the recent global financial crisis were motivated by people’s 
indignation at the increasing inequalities between ordinary communities and the richest 
groups. Yet, other scholars show that inequality does not seem sufficient to explain these 
events. In particular, Justino and Martorano (2016) show that the number of protests has 
increased in Latin American countries even though inequality has decreased; Verme (2014) 
also shows that inequality decreased in the period before the Egyptian revolution.  
 
This paper contributes to this literature focusing on the recent experience of the Western 
Balkans. After the decade of armed conflicts, these small countries started their economic 
and political transition in the early 2000s. Yet the arrival of the international financial crisis in 
the last quarter of 2008 has had significant economic and political consequences for the 
Western Balkans. In 2009, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita dropped by 2.7 per cent.1 
The country most affected was Slovenia, which recorded a GDP reduction of 8.2 per cent, 
while Albania was the only country recording a positive performance (+4 per cent). Over the 
most recent period, poverty in the region has slightly increased while inequality has 
decreased (Koczan 2016). However, it seems that the crisis has had a dramatic impact, 
especially on subjective assessments of living conditions. Indeed, people report high 
dissatisfaction with their living conditions and the share of people reporting that they feel poor 
is higher than the share of people below the monetary poverty line (Koczan 2016).  
 
At the same time, there is a growing sentiment that traditional political actors are not able to 
represent all strata in society, particularly the most vulnerable groups. Moreover, in many 
countries, the slow and demanding process of access to the European Union (EU) has 
increased political frustration and has reduced popular support for European institutions 
(Milošević and Džuverović 2015). As a result, while citizen participation through conventional 
channels has continued to decrease, there has been a rising opposition to political and 
economic institutions channelled by the emergence of new social movements (Milošević and 
Džuverović 2015). For example, in the spring of 2011, Facebook protests erupted in many 
cities in Croatia (Stiks and Horvat 2012); in 2012, significant protests occurred in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, blocking off the Federal Parliament building; and in Slovenia, forcing the 
government’s resignation (Musić 2013). 
 
Therefore, the main aim of this paper is to analyse how perceptions of the recent evolution of 
inequality have influenced people’s engagement in political activities in this region. In doing 
                                               
1  Data on GDP are extracted from the World Development Indicator database. 
9 
 
so, I use information extracted from the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) III conducted 
between the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016 by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in collaboration with Transparency International 
and the World Bank. This paper shows that perceptions of inequality affect participation in 
political activities. In particular, perceptions of rising disparities decrease people’s 
participation in voting in parliamentary elections while they increase people’s participation in 
protests. In addition, this paper confirms that political participation is influenced by other 
factors such as current economic, social and demographic factors and that the determinants 
of mobilisation through conventional and unconventional channels are very similar. This 
analysis is further supported by the empirical testing of a number of mechanisms that may 
shape the relationship between inequality and political participation such as expectations, 
changes in living conditions and corruption. I find that, in a context of rising disparities, the 
high expectations about future economic conditions increase people’s tolerance of inequality 
while low expectations tend to increase a sense of powerlessness, contributing to the lack of 
agency and the ‘silent’ acceptance of current conditions. Income shocks at national level 
increase aversion to inequality, influencing political activities, while high perceptions of 
corruption decrease participation through democratic conventional channels and increase 
participation in protests.  
 
These results provide important contributions to the literature. Although there is a large 
number of works analysing the relationship between inequality and political participation, this 
is one of the first studies to analyse the specific role of perceptions of inequality. To the best 
of our knowledge, there are only three contributions which have tried to explore this idea 
looking at recent facts. In particular, Loveless (2016) reports that perceptions of rising 
disparities have generated stronger demands for democratic participation in 13 Central and 
Eastern European countries. Verme (2014) analyses the evolution of perceptions of 
disparities in Egypt in the period before the recent revolution. Justino and Martorano (2016) 
investigate the impact of perceptions of inequality on the increasing number of protests and 
civil unrests in Latin America. However, the latter two studies lack a proper measure of 
perceptions of inequality. This work also advances this literature by identifying which 
mechanisms may shape the relationship between inequality and political participation. 
Finally, to my knowledge, this is the only paper to econometrically test the relationship 
between inequality and political participation in the Western Balkans.  
 
 
2  The consequences of perceptions of 
inequality on political participation  
2.1 The literature on inequality and political engagement 
A large body of the literature argues that inequality reduces citizens’ engagement in political 
activities (Anderson and Beramendi 2008; Karakoc 2013; Solt 2008; Verba and Nie 1972). In 
particular, this strand of the literature argues that people at the bottom of the distribution tend 
to participate in politics less than people at the top even though the former group should 
have higher motivations to challenge inequalities (Gelman 2009; Krosnick 1991; Lijphart 
1997). Several arguments have been suggested in order to explain these contradictory 
results. One of the most popular ideas is that political engagement is shaped by individual 
resources in terms of money, time and (civic) skills (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).2 
Money and time are helpful to contribute to political activities. Civic skills are necessary to 
make money and time useful for the development of political institutions (ibid.). Thus, 
inequality leads to unequal involvement in politics and therefore to uneven capacity to 
                                               
2  Verba et al. (1995) refer to several types of political participation such as voting in elections, working in or contributing 
 money to a campaign, taking part in a protest, etc. 
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influence the political agenda (Solt 2010). This, in turn, tends to create a vicious circle, 
according to which less participation influences individual endowments, fuelling economic 
inequality (Gaventa and Martorano 2016). Inequality may depress political participation 
through alternative channels. For example, high disparities may reduce motivations for 
participation among disadvantaged groups (Goodin and Dryzek 1980). The continuous 
marginalisation may generate the idea that voting (or participating through alternative 
channels) can actually be futile (Szewczyk 2015) and convince poor citizens to abandon 
engagement in political activities (Lukes 2005; Pateman 1971; Schattschneider 1960). 
Consequently, inequality may fuel a sense of powerlessness, contributing to the lack of 
agency and the ‘silent’ acceptance of the status quo among some population groups 
(Gaventa and Martorano 2016). Furthermore, poor people are also less optimistic about their 
future due to the fact that they have fewer opportunities to appreciate their talents (Appadurai 
2004). In this setting, they may believe that economic and social positions achieved by 
better-off people may not be achieved by them, thus reducing their expectations about the 
future and any efforts to promote better living conditions (Ray 2006). These psychological 
processes may contribute to generating inequality traps, in which poor people tend to 
assume behaviours that reproduce their initial conditions and trap them at the bottom of the 
income distribution.  
 
A large number of empirical studies confirm these hypotheses, looking at the experience of 
developed countries and, in particular, the United States. They show that people with low 
income, occupation status or education background tend to participate less than their 
counterparts (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995; Gelman 2009; Krosnick 1991; Lijphart 
1997; McDill and Ridley 1962; Scott and Acock 1979). Solt (2008) shows, in particular, that 
inequality negatively influences political engagement among the poorest strata in 23 countries. 
Anderson and Beramendi (2008) report a negative impact of inequality on electoral 
participation in a group of advanced economies. The negative impact of inequality on political 
participation is also confirmed by a number of analyses which use data at the subnational 
level (Boix 2003; Mahler 2002; Solt 2004). Finally, a number of works investigate the different 
dimensions of inequality. Campbell (2006), for example, reports that high disparities at 
different geographical levels in the United States reduce political participation in the form of 
protests and signing a petition.3 Krauss (2015) provides an additional interesting result 
analysing the role of social class in spite of inequality.4 In particular, he shows that individuals 
perceived to belong to a low social class tend to engage less in political activities than other 
groups. Persson (2010) analyses the impact of income and education inequality on political 
participation using data on more than 40 elections in 25 countries. He shows that inequality 
in these two dimensions has opposite effects; while economic inequality inhibits participation 
mainly among the richest deciles, ‘educational inequality has a positive effect on those with 
lowest education, i.e. it increases the probability of participation for those in the lowest 
stratum’ (Persson 2010: 2). 
 
On the other hand, rising or persistently high levels of disparities may also be hypothesised 
to increase people’s participation in political activities. Several contributions in the literature 
have attempted to explain why inequality may fuel political participation. First, it is possible 
that economic difficulties increase sense of deprivation (Runciman 1966), which in turn may 
provide people in the bottom of the distribution with additional motivations to participate in 
political activities (Filetti 2016). Second, high inequality and rising disparities may increase 
social tensions, polarising the political debate. This in turn is expected to cause a rise in 
political interest (Oliver 2001), which is considered one of the most important determinants of 
political participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba et al. 1995). While people may 
                                               
3  In particular, he refers to inequality at national, provincial and metropolitan levels. 
4  Krauss (2013) uses different sources of information. In particular, he has developed four studies. Participants in the 
first study were students from a large university in the midwestern United States of America (USA). Data in the 
second, third and fourth study were based on an experiment online developed through Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Krauss also uses some secondary data to complete his analysis.  
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have the same political skills, they pursue different interests, which tend to change according 
to their economic and social position. For example, low-income families have more 
incentives to participate and support redistributive policies. By contrast, rich people tend to 
oppose these policies in order to defend their privileged positions (Szewczyk 2015). As a 
result, contrasting interests fuel the political motivations of the worse-off and the better-off for 
increasing their political participation (Persson 2010). Finally, it is possible that high within- 
group inequality may lead to an increase in political participation when low-income 
individuals tend to imitate the participatory behaviour of high-income individuals (Giles, 
Wright and Dantico 1981; Szewczyk 2015).  
 
The idea that inequality increases political participation is also supported by a number of 
empirical works. For example, Oliver (2001) shows that people living in unequal communities 
tend to vote and engage in political activities to a greater extent than people living in more 
equal areas. Campbell (2006) reports that high inequality at the municipal level increases 
people’s economic and time contribution to campaigns, while high disparities at the county 
level increase the probability of voting in elections. Schroeder (2009) depicts that economic 
segregation matters when seeking to understand political participation. Galbraith and Hale 
(2008) confirm that spatial inequality influences voter turnout, using data on the US 
presidential elections over the period 1992 to 2004.  
 
2.2  Perceptions of disparities may matter more than the actual level of 
inequality in explaining people’s engagement in political activities 
Overall, the literature on inequality and political participation provides mixed results at best. 
While some scholars have shown that inequality boosts people’s engagement in political 
activities, others have demonstrated that disparities may depress political participation.  
 
This section discusses how inequality or rising disparities may influence political 
participation, reconsidering two strong assumptions implicit in the literature. First, many 
works assume that people benefit from the same information; but this is not true, because 
access to information is not the same for all individuals. Second, they assume that people 
have the same ability to quantify the value of disparities in society; yet this also does not 
stand, as it is quite evident that people do not have the same set of skills. Indeed, there is a 
new literature arguing that people’s understanding of inequality is based on cognitive 
elaborations driven by misperceptions of the reality (Brunori 2017; Chambers, Swan and 
Heesacker 2014; Cruces, Perez-Truglia and Tetaz 2013; Fernandez-Albertos and Kuo 2013; 
Gimpelson and Treisman 2015; Justino and Martorano 2016; Norton and Ariely 2011; 
Osberg and Smeeding 2006). Therefore, the main hypothesis of this paper is that 
perceptions of disparities matter more than the objective value of inequality in explaining 
certain motivations, behaviours and, in particular, political participation. Moreover, people 
may attempt to influence the political agenda by using different political channels. They may 
increase their participation through conventional channels such as elections and voting. 
People may also engage through unconventional channels and particularly more vociferous 
forms of political engagement, such as civil protests, demonstrations or occupying buildings.  
 
The relationship between inequality and political action is also mediated by several complex 
factors (Dahl 1971). I discuss below potentially relevant mechanisms, which I test in 
subsequent sections. In particular, I will focus on expectations, changes in living conditions, 
and political trust, which may all influence the connection between inequality and political 
engagement as well as the channel through which people decide to participate in political 
activities.  
 
1. Future expectations. The basic idea is that individuals may be more tolerant of existing 
disparities if they believe that their position will improve in the future. According to the 
famous ‘tunnel effect’ articulated by Albert Hirschman, an individual stuck in a serious 
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traffic jam could hope that his turn to move will come soon when the cars in the other 
lane begin to move (Hirschman and Rothschild 1973). Similarly, people left behind 
economically may show a high tolerance of rising disparities resulting from rapid 
economic growth because they expect to benefit from this increasing prosperity in the 
future (Deaton 2013). As a result, in such a context, greater inequality may not fuel 
social or political instability (Justino and Martorano 2016). 
2. Changes in living conditions. Yet, rising inequality may lead to opposite reactions when 
processes of modernisation and social changes are not able to fill aspirations and 
expectations in the society (Huntington 2006). In such a setting, economic shocks at 
household or national level (such as the 2008 financial crisis) may cause increased 
feelings of failure and disappointment, which in turn would increase people’s aversion 
to inequality. As a result, high or increasing disparities may lead to rising frustration 
about norms and rules, which in turn motivate people to change the status quo 
(Melamed and Samman 2013).  
3. Political trust. The way in which people participate may be influenced by views about 
political and social institutions. For example, trust in government may facilitate 
participation through conventional democratic channels. In particular, citizens may be 
more inclined to respect political rules if political institutions are seen as representative, 
fair and transparent. In contrast, citizens may reduce their engagement in politics when 
governments or other political actors are perceived as corrupt, unrepresentative and 
divisive (Fischer and Torgler 2013; Shapiro 2002). In such a context, protests may be 
considered as the most effective way of influencing political discussions and the 
decision-making process (Justino and Martorano 2016).  
 
 
3 Data and empirical strategy 
In this section, I test empirically the relationship between perceptions of inequality and 
political participation. The empirical analysis is based on Western Balkan countries: Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. 
Data are extracted from the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) III conducted between the end of 
2015 and the beginning of 2016 by the EBRD in collaboration with Transparency 
International and the World Bank. The LiTS III reports information related to different areas, 
including economic and political participation. The survey is nationally representative and 
contains data on about 1,500 households per country; the questions were the same in all 
participating countries, thereby providing harmonised sets of information. I use this survey to 
estimate the following model:  
 
𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼2 𝑍𝑖𝑗 + 𝜌𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗   (1) 
 
where i and j identify individual and country respectively, while uij is the idiosyncratic error 
term. In terms of empirical strategy, I apply an OLS estimator with country fixed effects in 
order to reduce potential omitted variable biases, while controlling for unobservable factors 
such as institution quality and macroeconomic conditions, which may influence participation 
in the political discussion.  
 
To measure political participation through conventional or unconventional channels, I 
consider two different variables assuming the value 1 if the respondent reported having 
participated:  
 
1. in the most recent parliamentary elections5 
2. in a lawful demonstration or thinks he/she might do. 
                                               
5  This paper focuses on parliamentary elections because all these countries are parliamentary republics. 
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Around 7 out of 10 respondents on average reported having participated in the most recent 
elections. With regards to protest, about 11 per cent reported having participated in a lawful 
demonstration while 37 per cent reported that they might do in the future.  
 
As explained above, the main assumption is that people are not able to quantify the recent 
trend of inequality in their country; these misperceptions may be very important to explain 
political participation. Therefore, I use a subjective measure of the evolution of inequality. 
People were asked to place their views about the change in the gap between rich and poor in 
the past four years. They had four answer options: ‘don’t know’; ‘became smaller’; ‘stayed 
the same’; ‘became larger’. I have recoded this variable into a binary indicator with value 1 if 
the respondent believed that the gap between rich and poor has become larger, and 0 
otherwise. What is interesting to observe is that people feel that disparities have increased 
even though inequality has decreased or remained stable (Figure A1). On average, 62 per 
cent of respondents felt that the gap between rich and poor has become larger while only     
5 per cent felt that the gap has become smaller (Figure 1). However, there are large 
differences across countries. For example, in Albania, around 40 per cent of respondents 
report that the gap between rich and poor has become larger, while in Slovenia the figure 
was close to 90 per cent (Table A1).  
 
Figure 3.1 Change in the gap between rich and poor 
  
Source: LiTS III. 
 
In the equation, Z refers to a set of variables introduced to control for factors that may 
influence political participation. I use the same set of control variables for all the empirical 
estimations. First, I introduce information on the household income decile to proxy for living 
conditions. As reported above, the literature provides mixed results about the impact of 
economic conditions on political participation. On the one hand, economic resources may 
play a key role for engaging in political activities as postulated by the resource model 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1975). On the other hand, it is possible that financial 
problems fuel anger and frustration and increase incentives to participate in protests (Sen 
2008). Second, I introduce a set of variables to capture the respondents’ demographic 
characteristics, particularly age, sex and civil status. Finally, I include information on the 
education of the respondent as well as two dummy variables indicating if he or she is a 
worker or student. More educated people are expected to be better informed and more 
involved in political processes than other population groups (Justino and Martorano 2016). 
Students and workers may be more likely to get involved in political actions thanks to their 
participation in student movements and labour unions (Valenzuela 2013). Variable definitions 
and descriptions are reported in Table 3.1 while summary statistics are reported in Table 3.2.  
 
0%
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Table 3.1 Variable definitions and descriptions  
Variable  Description 
Vote for parliament  1 if the respondent has participated in the most recent parliamentary elections 
Protests  1 if the respondent has participated in a lawful demonstration or think he might do 
Perceptions of rising 
inequality 
1 if the respondent agrees with the statement according to the gap between rich 
and poor has become larger 
Income decile Household income decile 
Female Female = 1; male = 0 
Age Age 
Married 1 if respondent is married 
Education 
class of education: 1 (no degree/no education); 2 (primary education); 3 (lower 
secondary education); 4 (upper secondary education); 5 (post-secondary non 
tertiary education); 6 (tertiary education - not university); 7 (Bachelor’s degree); 
8 (Master or PhD degree) 
Worker 1 if respondent works 
Student 1 if respondent studies 
Urban 1 if respondent lives in urban area 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the LiTS III. 
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Vote for parliament  11454 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Protest 12013 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Perceptions of rising inequality 12013 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Income decile 8995 5.34 2.87 1 10 
Female 12013 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Age 12013 47.85 17.36 18 95 
Married 12013 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Education 12013 3.99 1.69 1 8 
Worker 12013 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Student 12013 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Urban 12013 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the LiTS III. 
 
4 Empirical results 
Table 4.1 reports the results of the regression analysis. On the one hand, perceptions of 
rising disparities decrease people’s participation in parliamentary elections. In particular, the 
probability to vote is 5 per cent lower for people who believe that the gap between rich and 
poor has become larger. On the other hand, perceptions of rising disparities increase 
people’s participation in protests. In this case, the probability to take to the street is 5 per 
cent higher for people who perceive that income disparities have increased during the past 
years. This latter result is also in line with those reported by Justino and Martorano (2016) for 
Latin American countries. 
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Table 4.1 also confirms that political participation is influenced by current economic 
conditions. People who report higher income levels tend to participate more in parliamentary 
elections as well as in protests. Looking at the demographic factors, it is possible to observe 
that older people are more likely to participate in political activities through conventional 
channels. By contrast, females tend to participate less in protests, while students and people 
living in urban areas are more inclined to engage in political activities through unconventional 
channels. Finally, regression results suggest that people with a high probability to participate 
both in voting elections or in lawful demonstrations are part of working and educated social 
groups.  
 
Table 4.1 Determinants of individual participation in voting in parliamentary elections 
and protests in the Western Balkans, 2016  
  (1) (2) 
  Vote in parliamentary 
elections 
Participation in 
protests  
Perceptions of rising inequality  -0.050*** 0.046*** 
 [0.014] [0.014] 
Income decile 0.013*** 0.015*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] 
Female -0.012 -0.072*** 
 [0.013] [0.014] 
Age 0.005*** -0.004*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Married 0.026* -0.017 
 [0.015] [0.015] 
Education 0.016*** 0.039*** 
 [0.004] [0.005] 
Worker 0.077*** 0.104*** 
 [0.017] [0.017] 
Student -0.066 0.151*** 
 [0.043] [0.039] 
Urban 0.000 0.025* 
 [0.014] [0.014] 
Constant 0.342*** 0.517*** 
 [0.039] [0.037] 
   
Observations 8,700 8,995 
R-squared 0.074 0.139 
Notes: regression with robust standard errors. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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5 Robustness tests 
In this section, I develop a series of robustness tests to check the validity of the results 
discussed above by (1) excluding people who do not know about the recent evolution of 
inequality; and (2) using alternative dependent variables.  
 
1. Excluding people who do not know about the recent evolution of inequality. In the 
baseline estimation, people who report that they do not know about the recent 
evolution of the gap between rich and poor are included in the computation of the 
binary indicator measuring perceptions of inequality. The justification was that these 
people did not refuse to reply to the question; they were only not able to provide a 
proper evaluation of the evolution of inequality in their countries.  
 
An alternative strategy is to treat these answers as missing values (exclude them from 
the binary indicator measuring perceptions of inequality). Table 5.1 shows that, using 
this strategy, the regression results are very similar to the baseline estimations. In 
particular, perceptions of rising disparities decrease people’s participation in 
parliamentary elections while they increase people’s engagement in protests. The only 
difference is related to the size of the coefficients. According to Table 5.1, the 
probability to vote is 8 per cent lower for people who report that income disparities have 
increased during recent years, while the probability to take to the street is 3 per cent 
higher for the same group. The remaining results are the same for the baseline 
estimations. The only exception is related to the student coefficient; according to Table 
5.1, students are less likely to vote in parliamentary elections. 
 
Table 5.1 Determinants of political participation in the Western Balkans, 2016 – 
alternative computation of perceptions of inequality 
  (1) (2) 
 Vote in parliamentary elections Participation in protests  
Perceptions of rising inequality  -0.080*** 0.030** 
 [0.014] [0.015] 
Income decile 0.014*** 0.015*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] 
Female -0.009 -0.066*** 
 [0.013] [0.014] 
Age 0.005*** -0.004*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Married 0.015 -0.018 
 [0.015] [0.015] 
Education 0.016*** 0.041*** 
 [0.005] [0.005] 
Worker 0.064*** 0.105*** 
 [0.018] [0.017] 
Student -0.083* 0.151*** 
 [0.045] [0.040] 
Urban -0.002 0.030** 
 [0.014] [0.014] 
Constant 0.381*** 0.293*** 
 [0.040] [0.042] 
   
Observations 8,153 8,403 
R-squared 0.076 0.135 
Notes: regression with robust standard errors. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
17 
 
 
2. Alternative dependent variable. In this section, I estimate the baseline model using 
alternative dependent variables that measure political participation. To measure 
participation through conventional channels, I consider participation in local and 
presidential elections. In order to test participation through unconventional channels, I 
consider participation in the form of strikes and signing a petition. All these variables 
are dichotomous, taking value 1 in case of participation and 0 otherwise. 
  
Table 5.2 reports some interesting results. With regard to conventional channels, 
perceptions of rising inequality tend to reduce the probability to participate in local 
elections, but they do not affect participation in presidential elections. Concerning 
unconventional channels, results are remarkably similar to those for protests reported 
in the baseline estimation. In particular, the probability to participate in strikes or in 
signing a petition is 4 per cent higher for people who believe that income disparities 
have increased during recent years. As can be seen in Table 5.2, these probabilities 
are close to the probability to take to the street. 
 
Table 5.2 Determinants of political participation in the Western Balkans, 2016 – 
alternative dependent variables 
 
Vote in 
parliamentary 
elections 
Vote in 
local 
elections 
Vote in 
presidential 
elections 
Participation 
in protests 
Participation 
in strikes 
Signing 
petition 
              
Per. of rising 
inequality  
-0.050*** -0.030** -0.011 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] 
Income decile 0.013*** 0.005* 0.007** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Female -0.012 -0.019 -0.017 -0.072*** -0.073*** -0.066*** 
 [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] 
Age 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Married 0.026* 0.040*** 0.020 -0.017 -0.007 -0.009 
 [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] 
Education 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.010** 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.042*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Worker 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.063*** 0.104*** 0.098*** 0.093*** 
 [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] 
Student -0.066 -0.070 -0.036 0.151*** 0.093** 0.094** 
 [0.043] [0.044] [0.045] [0.039] [0.040] [0.041] 
Urban 0.000 0.008 0.029** 0.025* 0.032** 0.049*** 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] 
Constant 0.342*** 0.371*** 0.436*** 0.517*** 0.508*** 0.474*** 
 [0.039] [0.039] [0.041] [0.037] [0.038] [0.037] 
       
Observations 8,700 8,756 7,786 8,995 8,995 8,995 
R-squared 0.074 0.066 0.145 0.139 0.133 0.141 
Notes: regression with robust standard errors. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
18 
 
6 Potential mechanisms 
In this section, I investigate the conditions under which rising disparities influence 
participation in voting elections and/or in protests, following the discussion in section 2.  
The first mechanism I examine is whether the relationship between perceptions of inequality 
and political participation is mediated by future expectations. As explained above, high 
expectations about the future increase people’s tolerance of inequality. In particular, people 
do not care (or care less) about current disparities if they believe that their economic and 
social position will improve in the future. To measure expectations, I compare answers 
extracted from two questions in which people located themselves on a scale that measures 
one’s position in the wealth distribution today and four years from now. In this way, it is 
possible to distinguish between three groups: people who believe that their position will 
worsen (low future expectations); people who believe their position will not change; and 
people who believe their position will improve (high future expectations). Table 6.1 (columns 
1 and 2) shows that people with perceptions of rising inequality and low expectations about 
the future tend to participate less either through conventional or unconventional channels. By 
contrast, the interaction term between perceptions of rising inequality and high expectations 
about future conditions is never statistically significant. This latter result is in line with the 
tunnel effect hypothesis (Hirschman and Rothschild 1973), showing that people who believe 
that their economic and social position will improve in the future are more tolerant of current 
disparities.  
 
The second mechanism I examine is whether the relationship between perceptions of 
inequality and political participation is mediated by changes in living conditions. The main 
assumption is that an income shock may increase aversion to inequalities, which in turn 
could motivate people to mobilise. In order to test this mechanism, I consider two different 
statements. In the first one, people were asked their views about recent changes in 
household living conditions – i.e. ‘my household lives better nowadays than around four 
years ago’. Answers could range between 1 (‘strongly disagree’) and 5 (‘strongly agree’). In 
order to test my assumption, I have recoded this variable into a binary indicator with value 1 
if the respondents reported some or a complete disagreement, and 0 otherwise. As can be 
seen in Table 6.1 (columns 3 and 4), the interaction term is not statistically significant in the 
case of participation in protests while it is negative and statistically significant in the case of 
participation in voting elections. Yet, changes at national level may be perceived in a different 
way from changes at household level, weakening the sense of individual responsibility and 
feeding collective frustration and anger.  
 
To test this alternative channel, I use information extracted from the following question: ‘The 
economic situation in our country is better today than around four years ago’. As with the 
previous questions, answers could range between 1 (‘strongly disagree’) and 5 (‘strongly 
agree’) and I have recoded this variable into a binary indicator with value 1 if the respondents 
reported some or a complete disagreement, and 0 otherwise. Table 6.1 (columns 5 and 6) 
shows that the coefficient of perceptions of rising inequality is never statistically significant. 
However, the result is different when we interact this variable with the changes in a country’s 
economic conditions. In particular, the interaction term is negative and statistically significant 
in the case of parliamentary elections and it is negative and significant in the case of 
protests. So, tolerance of inequality tends to decrease while people prefer to take to the 
street if the worsening of economic conditions is understood as a result of forces that go 
beyond the individual’s responsibility.   
 
The third mechanism I examine is whether the relationship between perceptions of inequality 
and political participation is mediated by the level of corruption in the political system. As 
explained in section 2, the lack of trust in political institutions and high perceptions of 
corruption among the political elite may play a key role in political participation. To measure 
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the perceived level of corruption, I use information extracted from the following question: 
‘How many of the following people [i.e. president/prime minister and officials in office] do you 
think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?’ People 
were asked to place their views on a scale ranging from 1 (‘none’) to 4 (‘all of them’). Also in 
this case, I have recoded this variable into a binary indicator with value 1 if the respondents 
reported some perceptions of corruption, and 0 otherwise. Table 6.1 (columns 7 and 8) 
shows an interesting result. The coefficients referred to perceptions of inequality are not 
statistically significant. By contrast, the interaction term is negative and statistically significant 
in the case of voting in parliamentary elections and positive and statistically significant in the 
case of participation in protests. While perceptions of inequality per se might not be sufficient 
to explain how people engage in politics, the feeling of increasing disparities in a corrupt 
environment motivates people to mobilise through unconventional channels and reduces 
their participation in voting elections. 
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Table 6.1 Mechanisms  
 
Future expectations Worsening of household 
living conditions  
Worsening of country 
economic conditions 
Corruption 
 
Vote in parl. 
elections 
Participation 
in protests  
Vote in parl. 
elections 
Participation 
in protests  
Vote in parl. 
elections 
Participation 
in protests  
Vote in parl. 
elections 
Participation 
in protests  
Perceptions of rising inequality (pri) -0.047*** 0.043*** -0.037** 0.041** -0.025 0.026 0.005 -0.018 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] 
Income decile 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Female -0.011 -0.071*** -0.012 -0.072*** -0.012 -0.072*** -0.011 -0.073*** 
 [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] 
Age 0.005*** -0.004*** 0.005*** -0.004*** 0.005*** -0.004*** 0.005*** -0.004*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Married 0.026* -0.017 0.026* -0.017 0.026* -0.017 0.029** -0.021 
 [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] 
Education 0.016*** 0.040*** 0.016*** 0.039*** 0.015*** 0.040*** 0.017*** 0.038*** 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] 
Worker 0.078*** 0.105*** 0.078*** 0.104*** 0.078*** 0.103*** 0.078*** 0.103*** 
 [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] 
Student -0.066 0.151*** -0.066 0.151*** -0.066 0.151*** -0.066 0.151*** 
 [0.043] [0.039] [0.043] [0.039] [0.043] [0.039] [0.043] [0.038] 
Urban 0.000 0.024* 0.001 0.024* 0 0.025* 0.006 0.018 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] 
pri * high future expectations 0.013 0.026       
 [0.019] [0.019]       
pri * low future expectations -0.049** -0.043*       
 [0.023] [0.024]       
pri * worsening hh living conditions   -0.030* 0.011     
   [0.017] [0.017]     
pri * worsening nat. ec. conditions     -0.041** 0.033*   
     [0.017] [0.018]   
pri * corruption       -0.098*** 0.115*** 
       [0.017] [0.017] 
         
Constant 0.336*** 0.508*** 0.348*** 0.515*** 0.346*** 0.513*** 0.323*** 0.515*** 
 [0.039] [0.037] [0.039] [0.037] [0.039] [0.037] [0.039] [0.037] 
Observations 8,700 8,995 8,700 8,995 8,700 8,995 8,700 8,995 
R-squared 0.076 0.141 0.075 0.139 0.076 0.14 0.081 0.147 
Notes: regression with robust standard errors. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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7 Conclusions 
This paper investigates the role of inequality and, in particular, of perceptions of inequality on 
people’s engagement in political activities. In doing so, it focuses on the Western Balkans 
region, where many countries have experienced significant political changes and an increase 
in civil instability in recent years.  
 
The regression tests confirm that perceptions of rising inequality influence political 
participation: on the one hand, they decrease people’s participation in parliamentary 
elections; on the other hand, they increase people’s participation in protests. In addition, this 
paper confirms that political participation is influenced by other factors such as current 
economic, social and demographic factors. In addition, it shows that the determinants of 
mobilisation through conventional and unconventional channels are very similar. Lastly, the 
results point out that perceptions of inequality have a stronger effect on alternative forms of 
political participations such as voting in local elections, participating in strikes and signing a 
petition.  
 
The analysis also highlights that the relationship between perceptions of inequality and 
political participation is mediated by key mechanisms. Notably, high expectations about 
future economic conditions increase people’s tolerance of inequality while low expectations 
tend to increase a sense of powerlessness, contributing to a lack of agency and the ‘silent’ 
acceptance of current conditions. Income shocks at national level increase people’s aversion 
to inequality, influencing political activities, while high levels of corruption depress 
participation through democratic conventional channels and motivate people to take to the 
street.  
 
These results highlight the need to reduce inequality in order to improve the quality of 
democracy. However, as shown by the analysis, policymakers should also give serious 
consideration to people’s perceptions and subjective assessments of inequality, as this can 
aid successful implementation of a set of reforms and promote the process of democratic 
consolidation. Other democratic institutions may have important roles in such contexts. For 
example, the existence of parties or movements capable of giving voice to the experiences 
and views of the most marginalised groups may be crucial in preventing resentment, 
discharging grievances, and thereby mitigating social and political instability.  
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Annexe 
 
Figure A1 Income share gap between first and tenth decile over the period 2011–2015 
 
Source: EUROSTAT data. Notes: the initial gap refers to 2011 in the case of Croatia and Slovenia while it refers to 2012 in the 
case of Macedonia and 2013 in the case of Serbia. The last gap refers to 2015 for all the countries. 
 
 
Table A1 Change in the gap between rich and poor by countries 
 
Albania Bosnia 
and 
Herz. 
Croatia Kosovo Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Slovenia All 
Don't know 8.13 3.17 4.79 8.52 8.83 13.72 10.44 3.95 7.68 
Became smaller 10.91 1.38 1.4 8.11 4.21 3.33 5.96 1.61 4.61 
Stayed the 
same 
40.51 27.87 27.5 26.5 21.93 28.21 24.43 6.36 25.38 
Became larger 40.45 67.58 66.31 56.86 65.04 54.75 59.17 88.09 62.33 
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